

# **The relevance of Nigerian civil war 1967 to 1970 on strategic theory**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The relevance of Nigerian civil war experience of 1967 to 1970 to strategic theory and practice was investigated. The study drew extensively from primary and secondary sources such as oral interview of some retired military officers, civil servants and undertook visits to the National war museum at Umuahia, Biafra airport at Uli, Ojukwu Bunker, the then voice of Biafra, National Defence College Abuja. Secondary sources such as, textbooks, journals and lectures delivered by prominent scholars found in some University Libraries were also consulted. The study observed that Nigeria civil war adopted all strategies of war on land, sea and air as postulated by strategic theories during warfare. It was also discovered that the revolutionary theoretical framework of analysis is still very relevant and has been connected either as a cause or as consequence with many people and revolutionary wars, thereby elaborating upon the links between specific revolutionary concepts and the strategies and tactics of war. It was also discovered that Nigeria is yet to attain the level of becoming a laboratory for strategic studies, though qualified, in view of its abandonment of war monuments. The civil war experience has not brought about any socio-political economic and technological development in Nigeria and the prevailing situation in the country reveals that there is no peace and unity in the country. The study therefore recommends that; a viable institution should be put in place to sustain and maintain war monuments. The national war museum should be given a facelift by upgrading the dilapidated infrastructural facilities across the country especially in the five Eastern states of Nigeria.

Keywords: Civil, War, Strategy, Bunker, National defence, Umuahia, Tactics of war, War monument.

## **INTRODUCTION**

Wars are part of any civilization. Both small tribes and mighty nations in Africa have been involved in war since people first carved knives out of stone. The development of metals such as copper, bronze and iron makes the weapons of war to become more powerful. According to a report by the International Development Organization, "no less than 28 sub-Saharan African states have engaged in war since 1980" <sup>[2]</sup> Political corruption, lack of respect for rule of law, human rights violations are all common reasons heard for some of the causes of Africa's problems.

Africa, before the coming of Europeans, had developed a distinct rich culture and political institutions. Although, in most areas in Africa about 1000 A.D, social and political organizations were small in scale, most communities were organized in groups and villages were autonomous. Each group or village had its own community. Contact took place as a

result of trade, marriage, war and religion. Members of African communities engaged in certain specific vocations. Some engaged in cloth making, farming, fishing or trading, while some engaged in making iron, which was very important as a type of metal out of which hard tools and weapons could be made. Because of the fact that ores were available in large quantity in Africa, iron tools and weapons could be made in large quantity.<sup>[6]</sup>

The use of iron had significant effects on African people and their history. Firstly, iron tools and weapons enabled Africans to penetrate into the thick forest to settle, cultivate the land and defend themselves against aggressors. Secondly, and more importantly, iron weapons provided a better source of military power. Those who knew the use of iron were able to conquer and dominate their weaker neighbours. With the discovery of iron weapon, war became a dominant factor in inter-community relations. For instance, the Gambian people of the West African region developed a defensive strategy as far back as the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Strategy was aimed at building defensive strategy and slopes with spears and arrows. In fact, an English Captain who visited that part of the region in the early seventeenth century described one of such villages inside the fence, he wrote, 'they have built various rooms which are like little towers. From these, they can shoot arrows and throw spears whenever they are attacked.'<sup>[7]</sup>

Politically, before the coming of the Europeans, the continent of Africa had evolved different systems of government to suit specific groups of people in specific locations. In West Africa, for instance, the Edo and the Yoruba of the Southern Nigeria had a centralized system of government while the Igbo and the Etoi operated decentralized system of government but each of these systems took care of the people effectively and efficiently. The only difference was that the centralized system produced units that transcended village arrangement and settings.

In the area of civilization, the evidence of the Egyptian civilization proved clearly that Africa could compare favorably with Europe and America, in the artistic fields; testimonies of these are to be found among the Yoruba in Nigeria, particularly the Ife Art works, and "among "the Edo , even the Kroisan, (Bushman and Hottentots) of South Africa. Some of these bronze and brass figures dated as far back as the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Africans are also known to have the iron as far back as 500B.C. An example of iron working center is NOK located near Jos in Nigeria.

This research work is therefore an attempt to look at the Nigerian Civil War and examine its relevance to contemporary strategic theory and practice. The study will do a critical analysis of the Nigerian Civil War of 1967 to 1970 to see if it followed the principles of strategic theory and practice. It will also attempt to discover whether Nigeria could be adopted as a laboratory for contemporary strategic theory and practice in view of the improvisation of weaponry by Biafra during the war which could be developed for Nigeria's future strategic needs or studies.

Although, much has been written on the Nigerian Civil War, little is known concerning its contribution to strategic theory and practice, Recent developments in contemporary strategic

studies as an academic field of studies from the Euro-centric view pay little attention to African Wars as if Africa could not provide a good case for strategic studies whereas history has proved that such wars as people's revolutionary warfare or guerilla war and civil wars were common phenomena in African history.

## CIVIL WAR

Civil war is defined as 'large scale and sustained hostility (as distinct from mere revolt or uprising) between the organized armed forces of two or more factions within one state or between the government or a rebel or insurgent group.'<sup>[17]</sup>

A civil war is said to be a war between organized groups to take control of a nation or region, or to change government policies. Scholars of war are divided on the causes of civil war into either aggrieved versus grievance. Roughly stated are conflicts caused by two people, whether they are defined in terms of ethnicity, religion or other social affiliations. Sometimes conflicts begin because it is in the economic best interest of individuals and groups to start them. Scholarly analyses support the conclusion that economic and structural factors are more important than those of identity in predicting occurrences of civil war.

The intensity at which civil disturbance becomes a civil war is contested by academics. Some political scientists define as civil war any conflict having more than 1000 casualties. While others further specify that at least 100 casualties must come from each side.

For the purpose of this research, strategy is used to represent the analysis of conduct of war. War will be used to mean the act of violence aimed at achieving a political objective or goal.

Civil war will be used to represent an internal war which is within the boundaries of a state or between a government and the rebellious party, with legal claim of entitlement to sovereignty, territory over some part of the country.

## CONCEPT OF WAR

Today war is a greater threat to human life than famine or disease. And in the entire world only a few hundred or thousand men and women engage in serious professional research on what causes war and how war could be abolished.

War has been considered legitimate by many millions in most countries, who have seen it as a necessary means to a good end or at least as normal, expectedly part of human life recorded in the past and unavoidable in the future.

Quincy Wright developed four factors for the analysis of war, they are technology, particularly as it pertains to military matters; law as it pertains to war and its initiations; social organization, particularly in regard to such general purpose, political unit as tribes, nations, empires and international organizations and the distribution of opinions and attitudes concerning basic values.

These four factors correspond to the technological, legal, socio-political and biological, psychological – cultural levels of human life respectively. At each level, conflict is likely and violent conflict becomes probable whenever there is an overloading or breakdown of the mechanism or arrangements that have controlled the interplay of actions and actors at any level.

Violence and war according to Quincy Wright are possible and natural whenever adequate adjustments or controls on one or more of these levels are lacking.

“To different people war has different meaning. To some it is a plague which ought to be eliminated, to some, a mistake which should be avoided; to others, a crime which ought to be punished and to others it is an anachronism which no longer serves any purpose. On the other hand there are some who take a more receptive attitude towards war and regard it as an adventure which may be interesting, an instrument which may be useful, a procedure which may be legitimate and appropriate or a condition for existence for which one must prepare.”<sup>(15)</sup>

War can be regarded in the broader sense as a violent contact of distinct but similar entities. In this sense a collision of stars, a fight between a lion and a tiger, a battle between two primitive tribes and hostilities between two modern natives would all be war. This broad definition has been elaborated for professional purposes by lawyers, diplomats and soldiers and for scientific discussion by sociologists and psychologists.

From the sociological point of view, war therefore is a socially recognized form of intergroup conflict involving violence.<sup>(16)</sup>

Clausewitz defined war as “an act of violence intended to compel our opponents to fulfill our will” and elsewhere he emphasized the continuity of violence with other political methods.

Hobbes compared the oscillation of war and peace to the weather; “As the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together; so the nature of war consisted not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary”. As the weather may manifest many degrees of fairness or foulness, so the relations of any pair of states may be cordial, friendly, correct, strained, ruptured, and hostile or any shade between.

## STRATEGY

Strategy not only gives an aim to the whole military action which must be in accordance with the object of war; it also forms the plan of war, links together the series of acts which are to lead to the final decision and makes the plans for the separate campaigns and regulates the combats to fight in each”<sup>(13)</sup>

Strategy is the tool by which objectives are consciously and systematically pursued and obtained over time.

In its military aspect, the term had to do with stratagems by which a general sought to defeat an enemy, with plans he made for campaign, and with the way he moved and disposed his forces in war. Strategy is not planning; it deals with competitive situation in an uncontrolled environment. Planning deals with situations in a controlled environment.

Strategy is however an art, not a science; it is the art of the conscious mind in action when facing a challenge. Strategy is the art that man invented three thousand years ago; it is the greatest “winning tool” that man ever invented.

It enables the practitioners to see clearly the future of any encounter they undertake, whilst reacting rationally and consciously without the need for intuition or guesswork.

It is the art of the “Conscious Mind” the Art of the General in the battlefield; therefore it is: “A style of thinking; a conscious and deliberate process; an intensive implementation system; the art of ensuring future success.”<sup>[14]</sup>

When you know “what strategy is”, have learnt and practiced, you develop the strategist’s mind. “The Thinking General” hastrained himself to think several moves ahead of his opponents.

Strategy is the art of success in the utilization of the mind for the ruling classes in politics and business throughout the world.

Strategy, “the thinking of the General” is the Forbidden and Secret Art of Success for thousands of years.

Strategy deals with the wider conduct of war. It involves the uses of military force and non-military forms of coercion such as economic, political and psychological, to create an untenable situation for the opponent. Strategy is also a means of using military force to achieve a political objective. Strategy is different from tactics. Tactics is directly connected with battle, which is the arrangement and deployment adopted by force in battle to gain the maximum advantages from their weapons.

Strategy is directly connected with the conduct of war encompassing all its facets rather than the single facet of fighting.

## HISTORY AND CAUSES OF THENIGERIAN CIVIL WAR OF 1967 TO 1970

The history of Nigeria since 1914 is deeply rooted in major political issues which are violently contested along the lines of ethnic, religious and regional boundaries in the country<sup>(.1)</sup>

Webster, Boahen and Tidy (1979) noted that Nigeria inherited a constitution from the British government which gave absolute majority to one region thereby promoting regional politics and political division in the country. Thus the events that led to the

Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) cannot be separated from ethnic and religious distrust between the three major groups: Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa/Fulani. Prior to the civil war,

Nigeria had witnessed series of political crises. The most prominent were the Kano Riot of 1953, the Census Crisis of 1962, the Federal Election Crisis of 1964 and the Coups and Counter Coups of 1966.<sup>(2)</sup> Some analysts have argued that these are major remote causes of the Nigerian Civil War.<sup>(3)</sup> For instance, the 1953 Kano Riot occurred as a suspicion on the part of the Northern leaders that the Southern leaders were trying to force them into a national integration which they were not prepared for.<sup>(4)</sup> In an attempt to educate the Northerners about the benefits of self-government, the Southerners led by Chief S. L. Akintola of the Action Group went to Kano to gather support. This eventually led to a four days rioting at Sabongari, Kano between 16th and 19th of May, 1963. The implication of this riot apart from loss of lives is that it worsened the relationship between the Southern and Northern leaders.<sup>(5)</sup> Moreso, the Census Crisis of 1962 was based on ethnic suspicion where the Southerners assumed that the Census Director had been influenced to perpetuate Northern agenda.<sup>6</sup> While the Federal Election Crisis of 1964 centered around regional politics in which United Progressive Grand Alliance (comprising of NCNC and AG) and Nigerian National Alliance (comprising of NPC and NNDP). UPGA is south dominated while NNA is north dominated. Conversely, this pattern of political setting was crisis and on the large scale, full of blown coup d'etat.<sup>7</sup> On January 15, 1966 a small group of army officers, mostly Southeastern Igbos, overthrew the government and assassinated the Federal Prime Minister and the premiers of the Western and Northern regions. The Federal military government that assumed power was unable to calm down ethnic tensions or produce a constitution acceptable to all sections of the country. Its efforts to establish the Federal structure greatly increased tensions and led to another coup in July, 1966. The coup related massacre of thousands of Igbo in the north prompted hundreds of thousands of them to return to the Southeast where increasingly strong Igbo secessionist emerged.<sup>8 10</sup>

Fakayode (2003) reported that the July 1966 counter coup was followed by further civil disturbances in both the North and Eastern parts of the country. The Military Governor of Eastern Region, Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu refused to recognize Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon as Head of State in succession to Aguiyi Ironsi who was assassinated in previous coup. Lt. Col. Ojukwu had preferred a senior military officer in the person of Brigadier Ogundipe to succeed Ironsi instead of Gowon.

According to Ajetunmobi (2001) hostilities broke out between Lt. Col. Ojukwu, the military Governor of Eastern Region and General Gowon, Head of the Federal Military

government when the latter divided the four regions into 12 States in 1967. Soon, Lt. Col. Emeka Ojukwu declared the independence of the Republic of Biafra. The ensuing civil war was bitter and bloody ending in the defeat of Biafra in 1970.

The Nigerian Civil War marked a significant milestone in the military history and diplomatic relations of an independent African State. For the first time, 20th century technology reached a battlefield where Nigerians met with Nigerians in conventional

Combat. The quantities of modern weapons in the Nigerian-Biafra War were not substantial, but their impact was great. There were no tanks or heavy artillery (122 mm Russian Guns

were the largest)<sup>13</sup> , so the individual battle lethality cannot compare to the Arab-Israeli conflicts or other technology intensive campaigns in war torn zones. However, the Nigerian Civil War caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, primarily through the starvation associated with siege warfare.<sup>14</sup> As a result of Gowon's declaration of a state of emergency and Ojukwu's later announcement of secession and the birth of the state of Biafra, the following month of June witnessed mobilization for war on both sides. The series of border provocation on both sides of Eastern and Northern Region culminated in a shootout on July 6, 1967, The much expected war had started<sup>1</sup> The factors that led to the war can only be understood in the complexity and labyrinth of Nigerian political system and history<sup>1</sup> It also brought into sharp focus the issue of what constitute Nigerian national interest in the international system.

According to Osuntokun (1984) 'the question of *raison d'état* obviously centered first of all on maintaining national unity and taking all appropriate measures to prevent the territorial disintegration of Nigeria. This was the ultimate national interest. But national interest cannot be taken in isolation.'<sup>15</sup> Of course there was the very important need to first identify what constitute Nigeria national interest both domestically and international wise. African heads of states are guilty of personalizing their countries foreign policy formulation, in their power drunk statue as the head of their respective government,<sup>16</sup> they often take actions that is contrary to the rules and regulations that guide the international organizations to which they respectively belong and which in the long run works against the interest of their respective countries. This irrational decision in foreign and internal policy could be seen in the administration of Balewa and that of Gowon that later followed after Nigerian civil war and here could be found some of the reasons for the general instability that characterize African policy,

The Nigerian civil war was a cataclysm that rocked the emergent Nigerian state from 1967 to 1970. The 30 months civil war was preceded by a configuration of pre-independence and post-independence crises (Thomas, 2010). The Origins of the civil war could be located in a complexity of factors ranging from the remote which includes the military coups d'état of January 15, and July 29, 1966. Other remote factors are the regional election crisis in Western Nigeria in 1965; the Tiv riots of 1964; the Federal Elections of 1964; the killing of the Igbos living in Northern Nigeria from May to September 1966 (Cervenka, 1972; Oyeweso, 1992); the structural imbalance of the Nigerian federation; and, most importantly, the asymmetrical distribution of power among the various ethnic and geopolitical groups (Adeleke, , 2008).

Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu's declaration of the state of Biafra on May 30, 1967, was the immediate factor responsible for the civil war. Before this declaration, the Nigerian polity was geographically divided into 3 regions. These are the Northern, Western and Eastern regions. The Igbos are of Eastern extraction. Ojukwu's declaration will effectively excise the eastern part of Nigeria out of the federation. Thus, it was the

effort of the federal government of Nigeria to truncate the east's secession from the federation and Ojukwu's desire to ensure the survival of Biafra that started the civil war in

1967. Like all civil wars, the Nigerian civil war was unique in the context of the nation's history. This is because it was the most vivid expression of a country turned against itself.

Recently during Ojukwu's burial, a renowned scholar Nwoli while tracing the causes of the war explained that, "the incidents that led to the rebellion were triggered by the coup of 1966 where Ojukwu was a Lieutenant Colonel commanding a battalion in the Nigerian Army. He never supported the coup. In fact, it was his effort that led to the collapse of the coup in the North and then with General Aguiyi Irons' effort the coup collapsed in Lagos," Nwoli apparently trying to absolve Ojukwu declared that it will be foolhardy for anyone to continue blaming Ojukwu for the war. According to him, Ojukwu contributed significantly to the failure of the coup but unfortunately power had already been handed over to the military. Now when the counter coup occurred later in January 1967, it was Ojukwu that insisted that the next in command Brigadier Ogundipe should take over government following military tradition and being the next in rank. But the Northern forces refused. He and Yakubu Gowon were Lieutenant Colonels then, Ogundipe was their SENIOR. But the counter coupists insisted that they cannot take orders from their superiors. Thus Ojukwu refused to accept Gowon as his supreme commander or take orders from him". Nwoli insisted that to an extent, that was the beginning of the problem that led to the slogan on aburi we stand.

## NIGERIA CIVIL WAR STRATEGIES

Carl von Clausewitz once wrote that "Tactics is the art of using troops in battle; strategy is the art of using battles to win the war." [1]

In the early hours of July 6, 1967, Nigerian troops massed in the Northern Biafran borders invaded Biafra at different points at the same time, two in the Ogoja front and one in the Nsukka sector. Facing the eight battalions of the Nigerian Army in these fronts were three thousand Biafran soldiers, ill-equipped and without any heavy armour,

The two battalions of Nigerian troops attacked in Ogoja front at Nyonya and Gaken. The attack was preceded by heavy artillery and mortar bombardment. The Biafran troops without as much as with mortar and relying only on their submachine guns and bolt action rifles and some home-made mines withstood the attack. The Nigerian troops succeeded in capturing the two towns of Nyonya and Gaken on July 8. These were strategic points since they brought the main town of Ogoja within artillery range. It was not until about a week after that the Nigerian troops entered Ogoja town. The Biafran troops withdrew and fell back across the river south of the town where they mounted their defenses. Fighting now bogged down for a long time.

The main attack was in the Nsukka sector, Nsukka was a university town and about 45 miles north of Enugu, the capital of Biafra. In this sector, six Nigerian army battalions attacked heavily on July 8 and advanced four miles that day. As in the Ogoja front, the attack was preceded with heavy artillery bombardment, followed by attack with armoured cars, usually salades and ferrets. There was heavy fighting and both sides sustained heavy casualties. The Nigerian Army succeeded in capturing the university town on July 15. Fighting bogged down here as Biafran soldiers with their light weapons and applying guerrilla tactics



bewildered Nigerian troops. Two weeks after the fighting had, bogged down, two battalions of Nigerian troops were cut off eastern part of Nsukka and surrounded. Few got away. Many were captured as well as large quantities of arms and ammunitions.

Gowon had earlier announced that the Nigerian troops were sent down to the East merely to carry out "police action" against the new country. The Nigerian troops were to march down to Enugu, capture Ojukwu and bring him down to Lagos. It is surprising that in subsequent publications about the history of the war, Nigeria has continued to maintain that it was the Biafran troops that first attacked them, And, of course, eight battalions, with artillery, ferrets and -saiadins, could not by any stretch of imagination be called a "police action".

On July 25, Nigerian sea-borne troops invaded Bonny. Troops were made up of the Third Marine Commando, led by Colonel Benjamin Adekunle. They were landed with the Nigerian National Shipping Line and those belonging to Units: African Company (UAC) and Shell B.P. The landing was preceded by heavy bombardment from the sea with the Nigerian naval staffs led by the flagship NNS Nigeria. Bonny was an important, loading terminal. It was here that the Shell B.P. pipe line from Fort Harcourt pumped the crude oil from Biafra and Mid-West to ships OR for evacuation. The battle for Bonny was tough for Nigerians in spite of their naval superiority, it took some months before the Nigerian troops could complete the full occupation of Bonny as Biafran troops withdrew to Port Harcourt and other neighboring states.

## RELEVANCE OF NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR TO STRATEGIC THEORY AND PRACTICE

### CONCLUSION

This research work, examined the African war and civil war experiences with emphasis on the Nigerian civil war in an attempt to determine if they were in agreement with the contemporary strategic theory and practice. It was found that the African wars and civil war experiences especially the Nigerian civil war of 1967 to 1970 were in tandem with strategic theory and practice as put forward by the various strategic thinkers of the classical and contemporary periods. The civil war witnessed the use of land, sea and air strategies by both the Biafra and the Federal troops.

On the question of whether Nigeria could be made a laboratory for strategic theory and practice, it was discovered that much still need to be done in the resuscitation of the PRODA or put under another agency to look into the improvised weaponry by Biafra. Also, government needs to make a deliberate effort to assemble all the egg heads or researchers that were used by the Biafra research and production unit before the entire innovation goes into extinction. -In addition, the national war museum requires more attention than what it is at present because there is need for proper documentation of all the war monuments. In fact, when compared with the Holocaust museum in Jerusalem, the Nigerian war museum is nothing to write home about. Except government pay special attention in these areas, Nigeria, despite its civil war experience cannot qualify to be a laboratory for strategic studies.

On the issue of Nigeria being a Noble state, available records and documents as found out by this work shows that Nigeria is yet to possess what it requires to become a nation state, because after the civil war, Nigeria essentially reverted to an ordinary poor, non-technological, neo-colonial military organization that may successfully quell internal uprising against unarmed side but cannot in any way fight a modern war with an “average” military opposition even from Cameroon. The Nigerian Army as presently constituted lack internal cohesion which could be the reason why Nigerian leaders are hesitant to commit military in the face of threat to their territorial integrity. Hence it will be right to conclude that as at today, Nigeria is yet to bring itself to the forefront where it cannot be ignored by the international country which is a vital characteristic of a nation state. Even in Africa, the issue of giant of Africa is now a more slogan because South Africa, Egypt and Ghana are already contending powers.

It also observed that there is a general decay in the socio-political, economic and technological development of Nigeria after the civil war, successive leaders in the country made no conscious effort to develop the infrastructural facilities while that of the Eastern region are in a state of total abandonment by government which has created a very difficult situation for the economic growth and development of the Eastern states and this is not too good for the peace and unity of the country which was the actual reasons that triggered the civil war in the first instance. The political situation in the country is still incumbent on ethnic factor rather than having a nationalistic outlook, the spirit of nationalism is not anywhere near the political environment of Nigeria. It will therefore be right to conclude that the civil war experience has not in any way resulted in the rapid socio-political, economic and technological development of Nigeria.

The question of peace and unity of Nigeria is still very much dicey despite the fact that Nigeria has successfully organized few elections with controversial declaration of winners since the end of the civil war. Peace and unity still eludes the country because each day is witnessing the annual of different insurgency groups under different labels disrupting the peaceful and the peaceful co-existence of the country. The most recent of such groups are the “BokoHarram” and the Niger Delta militants that actually dictates the pace of security in Nigeria.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Though Africa is already a laboratory for strategy studies, it is therefore recommended that the experience of the Nigerian civil war can make Nigeria a laboratory for strategic studies if the government makes conscious effort at putting in place a viable institution that will maintain and sustain the project.

Also, the national war museum at Umuahia should be given a facelift if not equal to that of the Holocaust museum in Jerusalem, it should be upgraded to a manageable standard. For Nigeria to be relevant within the international system, leaders in the country should do everything possible to have an integrity or a breakthrough in either technology so as to be able to use it to earn recognition and respect within the international country.

Government should as a matter of urgency restore and upgrade the dilapidated infrastructural facilities in the five Eastern states so as to bring about the development of the area and in a way engender peace and unity among Nigerians to forestall the occurrence of what actually lead to the civil wars in the first instance.

There is also need to establish an internal cohesion among the military to make it more highly technological and organized instead of its present poor state that cannot withstand any external aggression from an average military opposition in order to secure our territorial integrity which is their primary assignment.

The work has successfully identified the need to develop our civil war monuments and war museum in order to be qualified as a laboratory for strategic studies. Also, all war researchers that contributed to the successful improvisation of weaponry during the Nigerian civil war should be assembled for further research so that Nigerian can start its technological advancement from there.

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